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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative method to solve
a Fault Tolerant Control problem. The model is a linear system affected by a
disturbance term: this represents a large class of technological faulty processes.
The goal is to make the system able to tolerate the undesired perturbation,
i.e., to remove or at least reduce its negative effects; such a task is performed
in three steps: the detection of the fault, its identification and the consequent
process recovery. When the disturbance function is known to be quantized over a
finite number of levels, the detection can be successfully executed by a recursive
decoding algorithm, arising from Information and Coding Theory and suitably
adapted to the control framework. This technique is analyzed and tested in a
flight control issue; both theoretical considerations and simulations are reported.
1 Introduction
Fault Tolerant Control (FTC for short, [5],[11],[6]) aims to cancel or contain the
consequences of faults in an automation system. Such an operation is funda-
mental in modern technological processes, which are required to assure robust
performance, stability and safety even in case of partial malfunctions or degra-
dations. Often, robustness is achieved by redundancy, say by the introduction
of many control components like sensors; nevertheless, this sophistication natu-
rally increases the probability of breakdown and then continues to motivate the
research on reliable control systems.
The problem of upholding the functionality of an apparatus affected a dis-
turbance is ubiquitous in the industrial and transport fields. In particular,
FTC systems are widely applied in those contexts where human health and
environment are concerned, for example, in the design of mechanical and chem-
ical plants; nuclear power reactors; medical systems; aircrafts, helicopters and
spacecrafts; automotive engines, railway and marine vehicles. Another interest-
ing application is in the communication networks (for instance, wireless sensor
networks), where the aim of FTC is to avoid unexpected interruptions of data
flow in case of troubled connectivity or impaired nodes. In all these contexts,
a satisfying FTC design can prevent non-reversible failures and stops, with the
ultimate objective of reducing health, environmental and economic damages.
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The literature about FTC is definetely widespread and contributions arise
from diverse applied mathematical domains. In order to get into the argument,
there are many survey works that introduce the main theoretical concepts and
provide classifications of the outstanding FTC approaches, with detailed refer-
ences. For example, we refer the reader to the recent review [28], which supplies
a comprehensive bibliography, and to [12], [21], [17], [25].
As far as the applications are concerned, aircraft flight control has been mo-
tivating FTC research since 1970s, given the evident danger that aircraft faults
may cause to human safety. Therefore, a significant amount of papers has been
produced on the argument, taking account of the wide variety of issues and
models introduced in the study of flight dynamics. For a general overview see
[20], [8] and the up-to-date book [6] that in Chapter II provides the list of the
most common flight control systems, with the relative references.
In this work, a linear model with a multiplicative disturbance factor is con-
sidered, which is very common in flight framework ([26]); in particular, we will
adopt a system presented in [2],[1] and studied also in [27], [10] as an application
test.
Even if FTC systems can be designed in many different ways according to
the specific aim they are conceived for, in general they all have to perform the
following main tasks:
1. the Fault Detection, i.e., the controller makes a binary decision on the
presence of a malfunction;
2. the Fault Identification, i.e., the controller determines or estimates the
size of the disturbance; if necessary, Identification is preceded by Fault
Isolation, that is, the location of the impaired component;
3. the eventual active compensation to the fault, i.e., the reconfiguration of
the system inputs and/or parameters in order to maintain, as much as
possible, the integrity of the process.
Fault Detection and Identification (FDI) can be undertaken in diverse ways. In
the cited works, in particular [6] a comprehensive discussion about the most
popular FDI schemes is presented: among them, we remind the unknown in-
put observers (UIO, [18], [24]) and residual generation, Kalman filtering, the
statistical methods and the more recent techniques based on neural networks
([14]).
This paper is devoted to the case when a quantized disturbance input is in-
troduced in a continuous linear system. Such an hybrid model, which combines
discrete and continuous dynamics, is motivated by the upcoming digitalization
of modern devices: a quantized disturbance may represent the switches of actu-
ators or sensors and the malfunctions in digital components; moreover, it may
describe the behavior of any mechanical device that is known to occupy only
certain positions and also the approximation of a continuous disturbance.
Results about FTC for hybrid systems are not very common. In part,
they can be retrieved in the extensive discussion about the detection of abrupt
changes in dynamical systems, whose leading work is [4] (while some further
contributions are given by [13] and [15]). The problem of estimating brusque
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alterations is always actual (as an example, see [23] and [22], which respectively
concern medical imaging and ground-penetrating radar issues) and in general is
approched by classical estimation techniques, such as Kalman Filtering.
Recently, input quantization in linear systems has been studied in particular
with the aim of reducing the effects of a coarse quantization ([16], [7]). In this
work, instead, our purpose is exploiting the information that the disturbance
input is quantized to detect the fault occurrene: it follows that quantization is
supposed to be already performed in a satisfactory way.
In order to evaluate the quantized input disturbance, an original Information
theoretic approach is proposed in this paper: given the discrete nature of the
disturbance, FDI is performed by a decoding technique derived from the frame-
work of digital transmissions and Coding Theory ([19]). The algorithm we will
introduce has already been tested in Deconvolution issues ([9]). The problem
we address here still is a Deconvolution problem, given that we assume a linear
system as model, but in addition a compensation task is introduced to mini-
mize the consequence of faults: our FTC is conceived with a feedback loop that
supplies a compensation input in real-time and then continuously reconfigures
the system (which naturally does not happen in classical Deconvolution issues).
The structure of the paper is the following: in Section II, we describe the
problem we aim to study; in Section III, we introduce the decoding algorithm
furtherly used for the Fault Detection; in Section IV, we provide a theoretical
analysis of the algorithm in terms of minimization of a suitably defined Error
Function that represents the distance between the optimal behavior (i.e., with-
out disturbance) and the output of the FTC itself; sensitivity to the false alarm
(false positive) and to miss fault detection (false negative); promptness of detec-
tion and reconfiguration. In Section V, wi give the design criteria to obtain the
best performance from our algorithm, while in Section VI we show a few signifi-
cant simulations about a specific numerical example, arisen from Flight Control
literature; finally, Section VII is devoted to some conclusive observations.
1.1 Notation
In this paper, the following notation will be used:
• given a subset A of a set X, 1A : X → {0, 1} will denote the indicator
function, defined by 1A(x) = 1 if x belongs to A and 1A(x) = 0 otherwise;
• the function erfc is defined by erfc(x) = ∫ +∞
x
e−sds for any x ∈ R;
• random variables will be indicated by capital letters;
• given any variable X, xˆ will denote its estimation.
2 Problem Statement
In this paper, we consider processes that can be modeled by the following linear,
finite-dimensional system: x˙(t) = Ax(t) + Bz(t)f(t) t ∈ [0, T ]x(0) = 0
y(t) = Cx(t)
(1)
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where x(t) ∈ Rn, y(t) ∈ Rm, f(t) and z(t) are scalar functions and A, B
and C are constant matrices with consistent dimensions. f(t) is a known input
signal, while z(t) is a disturbance modelling some fault in the system. Typically,
z(t) ∈ (0, 1]; if z(t) = 1, the system operates in its nominal regime and is totally
driven by f(t): this is the condition that one aims to reproduce even when
z(t) ∈ (0, 1), i.e., when some unexpected breakdown, interruption or loss of
effectiveness affects the dynamics.
In order to achieve that, a control input u is introduced, which adjusts the
dynamics as follows:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) + Bz(t) (f(t) + u(t)) (2)
Notice that to maintain the error-free behavior, say Bz(t) (f(t) + u(t)) =
Bf(t), in principle it is sufficient to fix u(t) = f(t)
(
1
z(t) − 1
)
, but, in the real
applications, this is often impossible for the following motivations. Generally,
the disturbance z is not known and the the controller can access it only through
the observation of the output y. In order to determine z one has to perform a
deconvolution, that is, to invert the solution of equation (2) with initial condition
x(0) = 0:
y(t) = Cx(t) = C
∫ t
0
e(t−s)ABz(s)(f(s) + u(s))ds (3)
Furthermore, the acquisition of the data usually is not exact. This inaccuracy
can be modeled by an additive noise n(t) in the output (in this work, n(t)
will be defined as a white gaussian noise): the available function now is r(t) =
y(t) + n(t).
Under this condition, the inversion of expression (3) becomes tricky: decon-
volution is in fact known to be an ill-posed and ill-conditioned problem, that
is, the uniqueness of solution is not guaranteed and also small errors in the
data may raise large errors in the solution. In conclusion, the reconstruction of
z(t) by inversion may produce outcomes very far from the correct ones; for this
reason, an estimation approach to the problem is the most suitable one.
In addition to that, in this work we make the following The controller can
access y only at certain time instants, say each τ time instants. Hence, the
available data are the samples rk = r(kτ) where K ∈ N, k ∈ {0, . . . ,K−1} (for
simplicity, let us suppose that Kτ = T ).
Moreover, in this work, two further main assumptions are made.
Assumption 1 The controller can access r(t) only at each τ time instants.
The available data are the samples rk = r(kτ) where k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and K ∈ N
is supposed to be such that Kτ = T .
Assumption 2 The disturbance function z(t) is known to be quantized over
two levels, say z(t) can assume only two values ζ0 and ζ1.
ζ0 and ζ1 may respectively represent the nominal and the faulty conditions
(ζ0 = 1, ζ1 ∈ (0, 1)). Such a binary situation naturally occurs in many engineer-
ing applications: it can model, for instance, the abrupt blocking of an actuator,
the sharp loss of efficiency of a device, the sudden disconnection of some com-
ponent, the functioning of alarm sensors. In the next, we will generally refer to
the jumps from ζ0 and ζ1 and vice-versa as switch points.
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Notice that Fault Detection and Identification are coincident under this assump-
tion: the decision on the fault presence automatically determines also its size.
In this work, being aware of all these conditions, we aim to estimate z(t)
as well as possible in order to provide the best control input to the system.
Clearly, the estimation has to be performed on-line, that is, each time a sample
is acquired (notice that the sampling inevitably undertakes some delay): each τ
instants the controller tries to detect eventual faults and consequently updates
the system design.
For mathematical simplicity, the eventual switch points of z(t) are suppoed
to occur at the time instants kτ , in order to have synchronization with the
output sampling. Hence, we can write:
z(t) =
K−1∑
k=0
zk1[kτ,(k+1)τ [(t) zk ∈ {ζ0, ζ1} (4)
Now, z(t) is equivalent to the binary sequence (z0, . . . , zK−1) ∈ {ζ0, ζ1}K : the
estimation problem is actually discrete. Let zˆk be an estimate of zk: since the
operation must be performed on-line, we expect zˆk−1 = D(r1, . . . , rk), where D
indicates a detection/estimation function.
Taking account of the conditions mentioned before, the natural definition of
the control input is:
u(t) = f(t)
(
1
zˆk−1
− 1
)
1[kτ,(k+1)τ)(t) k = 0, . . . ,K − 1 (5)
u(t) is computed and introduced in the system each τ time instants. Consider
now a generic interval [kτ, (k+1)τ). Being based on the estimate zˆk−1 relative to
the previous interval, u(t) is deceptive when a switch occurs at kτ : the delay τ
underlies a temporary, unavoidable deviation (even in case of correct detection)
from the right trajectory. This issue will be widely discussed in the next; for the
moment, let us just observe that switch points cause the most of the problems in
our FTC model. For this reason, permanent interruptions, i.e., failures (which
involve just one switch point) are definitely preferable than transient faults for
our purpose, though this should appear as a paradox in the practice.
2.1 Illustrative Example: a Flight Control Problem
A typical example of FTC problem arises from the literature of Flight Control.
Systems of kind (1) are often used to model different aspects of the aerospace
dynamics. For instance, if we consider the matrices
A =
 −0.5162 26.96 178.9−0.6896 −1.225 −30.38
0 0 −14
 (6)
B =
 −175.60
14
 , C = [1 12.43 0] (7)
the system (1) represents the longitudinal short-period mode of an F4-E jet with
additional horizontal canards, in supersonic conditions. The vector x determines
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the longitudinal trajectory: its three entries respectively represent the normal
acceleration, the pitch rate and the deviation of elevator deflection from the
trim position. The output y(t) is the C∗ response, a usual parameter in flight
mechanics that synthesizes the aircraft response to the pilot inputs; typically,
the C∗ response must lie in a given admissible envelope.
This application example is illustrated in the Appendix D.1 of [2] and studied
also in [1],[27],[10].
In this context, f(t) can be interpreted as the elevator deflection command
and z(t) as the indicator of the status of the elevators: z = ζ0 may attest a good
status, while the switch to z = ζ1 may denote an abrupt loss of effectiveness.
In such a case, the controller is required to detect the accident and add the
suitable control input u(t) in order to recover the optimal trajectory, say the
one imposed by the flight plan. In terms of the output y(t), one aims to maintain
or to bringit it back into the prescribed envelope.
Notice that in this case, it makes sense to suppose the fault to be definitive,
that is, the elevator cannot recover its efficiency during the flight. We then
talk about a failure. This situation often occurs in the applications, which
motivates us to focus on it in our following analysis. This Flight Problem will
be retrieved later and used as test application for the implementation of our
detection algorithm, which is introduced in the next section.
3 Fault Detection: The One State Algorithm
Given the quantization of zk ∈ {ζ0, ζ1}, it makes sense to settle the same set for
the estimation: zˆk ∈ {ζ0, ζ1}. This consideration arises from coding/decoding
techniques in digital transmissions, where unknown input messages, that are
combinations of symbols from a known finite alphabet, must be recovered within
the same alphabet. In other terms, the decoder is an estimator that exploits the
prior information about the input source.
The detection method that we introduce in this section is derived from an
optimal decoding algorithm named BCJR after its authors Bahl, Cocke, Jelinek
and Raviv (see [3]). Given the noisy output of a digital transmission, the BCJR
computes the probabilities of all the possible codewords, implementing a max-
imum a posteriori (MAP, [19]) estimation through a recursive procedure. In
particular, given codes defined on trellises, it evaluates the a posteriori proba-
bilities of each state.
The classical version of the algorithm is constituted by two recursions (one
forward, one backward) and requires the transmission of the whole message
before decoding. Moreover, it also requires the system to have a finite number
of states. Nevertheless, it is possibile to modify the proceudre to avoid these
bonds: in spite of reliability, one can make it causal (hence to work on line) by
removing the backward recursion and also it can be simplified by considering
not all the possible states, but just a fixed number of states. In [9], these
variations are widely discussed. The algorithm we introduce here is exactly a
causal BCJR considering just one state at each step (for this reason we refer
to it as the One State Algorithm). The compuations of the probabilities is in
this case straightforward and reduces to the comparison between two Euclidean
distances at each step. This makes the algorithm definetely low-complexity,
which encourages its implementation. Its performance actually depends on the
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specific application case and will be analysed in the next sections.
Now, let us describe the operative structur of the One State Agorithm in
detail.
3.1 One State Algorithm’s pattern
Before showing the algorithm, notice that the solution of the equation (3) can
be written recursively as
xk = e
τAxk−1 + zk−1(1− uk−1)
∫ τ
0
esABf(kτ − s)ds
= eτAxk−1 +
zk−1
zˆk−2
∫ τ
0
esABf(kτ − s)ds
x0 = 0
(8)
where xk = x(kτ), k = 0, . . . ,K. Now, the key idea of the One State procedure
is to provide a recursive estimation of the state xk and of zk−1 given the current
lecture rk and the estimate of the previous state xk−1.
In the next, let us use the following notation: nk = n(kτ), dE indicates the
Euclidean distance and finally:
Mτ,k =
∫ τ
0
esABf(kτ − s)ds (9)
The One State Algorithm’s pattern is then the following:
1. k = 0. Initialization: xˆ0 = 0;
2. k = 1.
System evolution (with no compensation): x1 = z0Mτ,1.
Lecture: r1 = y1 + n1 = Cx1 + n1.
Disturbance Estimation: zˆ0 =
{
ζ0 if dE(r1, ζ0CMτ,1) ≤ dE(r1, ζ1CMτ,1)
ζ1 otherwise
State Estimation : xˆ1 = zˆ0Mτ,1.
3. k = 2, . . . ,K.
System evolution (with compensation): xk = e
τAxk−1 +
zk−1
zˆk−2
Mτ,k.
Lecture: rk = yk + nk = Cxk + nk.
Disturbance Estimation: zˆk−1 =

ζ0 if dE(rk,Ce
τAxˆk−1 + ζ0zˆk−2 CMτ,k)
≤ dE(rk,CeτAxˆk−1 + ζ1zˆk−2 CMτ,k)
z1 otherwise
State Estimation: xˆk = e
τAxˆk−1 +
zˆk−1
zˆk−2
Mτ,k.
Notice that the system does not have compensation in the first interval [0, τ),
as the first useful lecture is performed at time t = τ . For the binary nature of
each zk, the process of estimation/detection reduces here to the comparison of
two distances. Moreover, the storage required is of two locations (one float for
the current state and one boolean for the current disturbance): the algorithm
is definitely low-complexity.
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4 Theoretical Analysis of the One State Algo-
rithm
This section is devoted to the theoretical description of the behavior and perfor-
mance of the One State Algorithm applied to the system (1)-(4) with a failure,
that is, there exists a time instant TF = kF τ ∈ [0, T ], kF ∈ N such that
z(t) =
{
ζ0 = 1 t ∈ [0, TF )
ζ1 ∈ (0, 1) t ∈ [TF , T ] (10)
or equivalently, zk = ζ0 for k = 0, 1, . . . , kF−1 and zk = ζ1 for k = kF , 1, . . . ,K−
1. Switch points are particulary tricky and the choice to focus on a system with
just one switch point allows to isolate the problem and to understand completely
the consequences of a switch. On the other hand, this case is crucial for the
applications, where the problem of failures is dramatically serious.
Our model can be naturally described in probabilistic terms: the fact that
lecture noise is supposed to be white gaussian, (that is, a sequence of inde-
pendent gaussian random variables Nk ∼ N (0, σ2)) introduces some amount of
uncertainty in the system. In particular, also zˆ, x, y, r, xˆ are random vari-
ables, as they are directly or indirectly functions of the noise. To emphasize
that stochastic nature, from now onwards, we will indicate random variables
by capital letters. Let us resume the complete recursive system in probabilistic
terms:
X0 = 0, Xˆ0 = 0, Zˆ−1 = ζ0 = 1
Xk = e
τAXk−1 +
zk−1
Zˆk−2
Mτ,k
Yk = CXk
Rk = Yk +NK
Zˆk−1 = D1(Rk, Xˆk−1, Zˆk−2)
Xˆk = e
τAXˆk−1 +
Zˆk−1
Zˆk−2
Mτ,k, k = 1, . . . ,K
(11)
where D1 indicates the One State detection function. Notice that X0, Zˆ−1, X1,
Y1 are actually deterministic, in particular, fixing Zˆ−1 = ζ0 = 1 is just an other
way to state that there is no compensation for the system in the first interval
[0, τ).
Finally, we remark that z(t) is not supposed to be driven by some prob-
abilistic law. Such an information on the input might be useful to improve
the detection and has been studied in other deconvolutio contexts (see, for in-
stance, [9]). Nevertheless, in this work we rather prefer to focus on a specific
disturbance.
4.1 The Error Function
The performace of the algorithm must be determined through the evaluation
of a suitable error function, say a distance between the desired and the real
trajectories. In this work, we adopt as error function the discrete stochastic
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process (Ek)k=0,1,... that describes the signed distance between the trajectory
of the system with control and compensation Xk and the nominal trajectory
xN (t), at time instants kτ , k = 0, 1, . . . :
Ek = Xk − xN (kτ)
= eτAEk−1 +
(
zk−1
Zˆk−2
− 1
)
Mτ,k k = 1, . . . ,K
E0 = 0.
(12)
The so-defined error function is characterized by the following fact:.
Proposition 1 For any k0, n ∈ N, the event {Ek0+n = enτAEk0} corresponds
to the event {Zˆk−1 = zk for all k = k0, k0 + 1, . . . k0 + n]}.
Proof It immediately follows from the definition of Ek: for any n ∈ N, the event
{Ek+1 = eτAEk} is equivalent to {Zˆk−1 = zk} and then {Ek0+n = enτAEk0}
corresponds to the event {Zˆk0−1 = zk0 , Zˆk0 = zk0+1, . . . , Zˆk0+n−1 = zk0+n}.
Notice that under the hypothesis of the proposition and if A is asymptotically
stable, Ek exponentially decades to zero, regardless of the initial value Ek0 .
Moreover, observe that the condition Zˆk−1 = zk is not the event of correct
detection Zˆk = zk, since the feedback in the system implies a delay τ ; however,
if zk is constant over the considered interval, the two events are the same. In the
next, we will focus on this context of constant disturbance, which models the
state of the system before and after an irreversible failure. In particular, we will
study the conditions to obtain correct detection, which leads to the exponential
decay of the error; we will show that even if we cannot achieve the certainty
of decodig exaclty in the presence of noise, however we can approximate this
condition satisfactorily, that is, with a probability close to one, at least in some
common situations.
More precisely, our goal is to study the probability of the event Ek0+n =
enτAEk0 conditioned to the fact that zk constant for anyk ∈ [k0, k0 + n] and
given some initial conditions at k0 concerning the state of the algorithm, which
will be defined later. In particular, we will find out the conditions that make
this probability sufficiently close to one, for a sufficiently large n. This includes
the probability to obtain a very small EK , starting from any initial error Ek0 ,
and to preserve it from further perturbations. In the next, we will give the
formal definition of the probability described now and we will refer to it as the
probability of n-step error decay.
Before that, we need to evaluate the detection error probability, which is
defined and computed in the next paragraph.
4.2 Computation of the Detection Error Probability
Let us define the stochastic process (Dk)k=0,1,... that represents the distance
between the states estimated by the One State procedure and the ones corre-
sponding to the system with compensation:{
Dk = Xˆk −Xk = eτADk−1 + Zˆk−1−zk−1Zˆk−2 Mτ,k
D0 = 0.
Then,
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Definition 2 Given k ∈ N, d ∈ Rn and ζ ∈ {ζ0, ζ1}, we define the Detection
Error Probability ( DEP for short) as
DEP(k, d, ζ) = P
(
Zˆk 6= zk|Dk = d, Zˆk−1 = ζ
)
.
By the definition of Dk, the DEP is equal to
P (Zˆk 6= zk, Dk+1 = eτAd+ z
c
k − zk
zk−1
Mτ,k+1|Dk = d, Zˆk−1 = zk−1) (13)
where zck indicates the complementary of zk in {ζ0, ζ1}. This probability may
be interpreted as the transition probability of the Markov Process
(Dk, Zˆk−1)k=0,1,...
in the state space D×{ζ0, ζ1}, D ⊂ Rn, with starting state (D0, Zˆ−1) = (0, ζ0).
The DEP, which is fundamental to calculate the probability of the event
{Ek0+n = enτAEk0} as shown in the next paragraph, can be analytically evalu-
ated in the case of scalar output (m = 1 in the system (1)) and extended to the
case m > 1 with no particular difficulty, through some numerical techniques. In
this paper, we discuss in the case m = 1, which turns out to be interesting for
the possibility of analytically describing the behavior of the DEP with respect to
the parameters and to analytically derive design criteria for the fault detection.
In the sequel, we then assume Yk, Rk ∈ R, k = 1, . . . ,K.
Let
Swk = Ce
τAXˆk−1 +
w
Zˆk−2
CMτ,k ∈ R
with w ∈ {ζ0, ζ1} be the two possible received signals estimated by the One State
Algorithm at the generic step k. The DEP is then computed in the following
Proposition 3 For any k = 1, 2, . . . ,K,
DEP(k − 1,d, ζ) =
=
1
2
erfc

∣∣∣ ζ0−ζ12ζ CMτ,k∣∣∣+ CeτAd [(1− 21{ζ0}(zk−1)) (1− 21(Sζ1k ,+∞)(Sζ0k ))]
σ
√
2

(14)
Proof Under the hypothesis that zk−1 = ζ1 the DEP is given by:
DEP(k − 1,d, ζ)|(zk−1=ζ1) = P
(
Zˆk−1 = ζ0
∣∣∣Dk−1 = d, Zˆk−2 = ζ, zk−1 = ζ1)
= P
(
|Rk − Sζ0k | < |Rk − Sζ1k |
∣∣∣Dk−1 = d, Zˆk−2 = ζ, zk−1 = ζ1)
=

P
(
Rk <
S
ζ1
k +S
ζ0
k
2
∣∣∣Dk−1 = d, Zˆk−2 = ζ, zk−1 = ζ1) if Sζ1k > Sζ0k
P
(
Rk ≥ S
ζ1
k +S
ζ0
k
2
∣∣∣Dk−1 = d, Zˆk−2 = ζ, zk−1 = ζ1) otherwise.
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If Sζ1k > S
ζ0
k :
P
(
Rk <
Sζ1k + S
ζ0
k
2
∣∣∣Dk−1 = d, Zˆk−2 = ζ, zk−1 = ζ1) =
= P
(
Rk < Ce
τAXˆk−1 +
ζ0 + ζ1
2ζ
CMτ,k |Dk−1 = d
)
= P
(
CXk +Nk < Ce
τAXˆk−1 +
ζ0 + ζ1
2ζ
CMτ,k |Dk−1 = d
)
= P
(
CeτAXk−1 +
ζ1
ζ
CMτ,k +Nk < Ce
τAXˆk−1 +
ζ1 + ζ0
2ζ
CMτ,k |Dk−1 = d
)
= P
(
Nk < Ce
τAd +
ζ0 − ζ1
2ζ
CMτ,k
)
=
1
2
erfc
(−CeτAd + ζ1−ζ02ζ CMτ,k
σ
√
2
)
.
The last step depends on the gaussian distribution of Nk; notice also that
ζ1−ζ0
ζ CMτ,k = S
ζ1
k − Sζ0k > 0.
It follows also that for Sζ1k ≤ Sζ0k :
P
(
Rk ≥ S
ζ1
k + S
ζ0
k
2
∣∣∣Dk−1 = d, Zˆk−2 = ζ, zk−1 = ζ1) = 1−1
2
erfc
(
−CeτAd + ζ1−ζ02z CMτ,k
σ
√
2
)
.
where ζ1−ζ0ζ CMτ,k = S
ζ1
k − Sζ0k ≤ 0.
Summing up,
DEP(k − 1,d, ζ)|(zk−1=ζ1) =
= P
(
|Rk − Sζ0k | < |Rk − Sζ1k |
∣∣∣Dk−1 = d, Zˆk−2 = ζ, zk−1 = ζ1)
=

1
2erfc
(
−CeτAd+ ζ1−ζ02ζ CMτ,k
σ
√
2
)
if Sζ1k > S
ζ0
k
1− 12erfc
(
−CeτAd+ ζ1−ζ02ζ CMτ,k
σ
√
2
)
otherwise.
This actually corresponds to the false negative probability. The false positive
probability DEP(k−1,d, ζ)|(zk−1=ζ0) can be computed in the same way and the
result is:
DEP(k − 1,d, ζ)|(zk−1=ζ0) = P
(
Zˆk−1 = ζ1
∣∣∣Dk−1 = d, Zˆk−2 = ζ, zk−1 = ζ0)
= P
(
|Rk − Sζ1k | < |Rk − Sζ0k |
∣∣∣Dk−1 = d, Zˆk−2 = ζ, zk−1 = ζ0)
=

1− 12erfc
(
−CeτAd− ζ1−ζ02ζ CMτ,k
σ
√
2
)
if Sζ1k > S
ζ0
k
1
2erfc
(
−CeτAd− ζ1−ζ02ζ CMτ,k
σ
√
2
)
otherwise.
The thesis is then proved.
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Remark 1 If d = 0 ∈ Rn,
DEP(k − 1, 0, ζ) = 1
2
erfc

∣∣∣ ζ0−ζ12ζ CMτ,k∣∣∣
σ
√
2

=
1
2
erfc
(
|Sζ0k − Sζ1k |/2
σ
√
2
)
.
(15)
This expression suggests an Information theoretic intepretation of our problem.
In fact, the presence of the gaussian noise in the data lecture can be thought
as if signal yk was transmitted on an Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN)
channel. If Dk−1 = 0, yk can be S
ζ0
k or S
ζ1
k . Moreover, if we shift the signals by
their average, so that they become antipodal ±S
ζ0
k −S
ζ1
k
2 , the average energy per
channel use at step k is Ek =
(
S
ζ0
k −S
ζ1
k
2
)2
. Given that the spectral density of
the gaussian noise is N0 = 2σ
2, the argument of the erfc function in (15) turns
out to be the square root of the so called Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR), defined
as SNRk = Ek/N0, of our ideal channel.
Generally, the SNR compares the magnitudes of the transmitted signal and
of the channel noise and it is widely used in Informatiom Theory to describe
channel performance. In our framework, the SNR determines the reliability of
the detection, say the reliability of the channel where yk is ideally transmitted.
This remark emphasizes that our problem is analogous to a common digital-
transmission paradigm and bears out the idea of using decoding techniques to
the detection task.
In the next, we will use the common dB notation for the SNR, that is, we
express it as 10 log10 of its value.
Remark 2 Since typically ζ1 < ζ0, by expression (15) we have
DEP(k − 1, 0, ζ1) < DEP(k − 1, 0, ζ0).
Given that Zˆk−2 = ζ1 is generally more likely when zk−2 = ζ1 (otherwise our
detection method would be improper), we can conclude that our detection algo-
rithm is more reliable after the failure, or, in other terms, it is more sensitive
to false positives.
4.3 Computation of the Probability of n-step Error Decay
Given a time interval [k0, k0 + n), k0, n ∈ N, k0 ≥ 1, we can formally define the
probability of n-step error decay (EDPn for short) as
EDPn(k0,d, ζ, η) =
P
(
Ek0+n = e
nτAEk0
∣∣Dk0−1 = d, Zˆk0−2 = ζ, zk = η for any k = k0 − 1, . . . , k0 + n− 1))
where d ∈ Rn, ζ, η ∈ {ζ0, ζ1}. Notice that zk is assumed to be constant in
[k0−1, k0+n−1], that is, we consider the system before or after a failure event.
Recalling the Proposition 1, the EDP is connected to the DEP by the following
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expression:
EDP1(k0,d, ζ, η) = P
(
Ek0+1 = e
τAEk0
∣∣Dk0−1 = d, Zˆk0−2 = ζ, zk0−1 = zk0 = η)
= P
(
Zˆk0−1 = zk0
∣∣Dk0−1 = d, Zˆk0−2 = ζ, zk0−1 = zk0 = η)
= 1−DEP(k0 − 1,d, ζ)∣∣zk0−1=η
that is, the Error decays when the detection is correct. Notice that this relation
between EDP and DEP subsists in virtue of the condition zk0−1 = zk0 : if k0
were a switch point, the feedback delay would produce a deviation in the Error
Function in case of correct detection.
Generalizing to n steps,
EDPn(k0,d, ζ, η) =
= P (Zˆk0−1 = Zˆk0 = · · · = Zˆk0+n−2 = η
∣∣Dk0−1 = d, Zˆk0−2 = ζ)
= P
(
(Dk0 , Zˆk0−1) = (e
τAd, η)|(Dk0−1, Zˆk0−2) = (d, ζ)
)
·
·
n−1∏
m=1
P
(
(Dk0+m, Zˆk0+m−1) = (e
(m+1)τAd, η)
∣∣(Dk0+m−1, Zˆk0+m−2) = (emτAd, η))
= EDP1(k0,d, ζ, η)
n−1∏
m=1
EDP1(k0 +m, e
mτAd, η, η)
=
(
1−DEP(k0 − 1,d, ζ)
)∣∣zk0−1=η
n−1∏
m=1
(
1−DEP(k0 +m− 1, emτAd, η)
)∣∣zk0+m−1=η
By Proposition 3, this is equal to
EDPn(k0,d, ζ, η) =
=
1
2
erfc
−
∣∣∣ ζ0−ζ12ζ CMτ,k0∣∣∣+ CeτAd [(1− 21{ζ0}(η)) (1− 21(Sζ1k ,+∞)(Sζ0k ))]
σ
√
2

·
n−1∏
m=1
1
2
erfc
−
∣∣∣ ζ0−ζ12η CMτ,k0+m∣∣∣+ Ce(m+1)τAd [(1− 21{ζ0}(η)) (1− 21(Sζ1k+m,+∞)(Sζ0k+m))]
σ
√
2
 .
(16)
Our next goal is to evaluate the EDPn in different instances of system (1,10).
First of all, let us distinguish what happens before and after the failure.
4.4 False positive evaluation
Let suppose the system to be affected by a failure according to the model (10)
with kF ≥ 1, that is, the system is not faulty from the beginning. In particular,
since there is no compensation at the first time step (or equivalently Zˆ−1 = ζ0),
no false positive is produced at k = 0. Then, studying the EDP in [1, kF )
actually corresponds to evaluate the probability that no false postives occur
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during the whole pre-failure transient regime. Given that D0 = 0, we have
EDPkF−1(1, 0, ζ0, ζ0) =
kF−1∏
m=1
1
2
erfc
−
∣∣∣ ζ0−ζ12ζ0 CMτ,m∣∣∣
σ
√
2
 . (17)
Since E1 = 0 and D0 = 0, then EDP
kF−1(1, 0, ζ0, ζ0) = P (EkF = 0) = P (DkF =
0).
4.5 Switch Point
Suppose that DkF = 0, then in particular, ZˆkF−1 = zkF−1 and ZˆkF−1 6= zkF .
In other terms, the detection is correct, but the compensation, based on the
detection at the previous step, is not efficient in correspondance of a switch
point. Our detection method cannot control what happens at step at step kF ,
that is, in the time interval [TF , TF + τ).
4.6 False negative evaluation
Given that we cannot control the system immediately after the switch point,
it is likely that EkF+1 6= 0. We now want to study the probability of decay of
the Error Function towards zero, which actually corresponds to the evaluation
of the false negatives. In fact, under the hypothesis DkF = 0 (i.e., no false
positives and in particular ZˆkF−1 = ζ0), for any n ∈ N,
EDPn(kF + 1, 0, ζ0, ζ1) = EDP
1(kF + 1, 0, ζ0, ζ1)
n−1∏
m=1
EDP1(kF + 1 +m, 0, ζ1, ζ1)
1
2
erfc
−
∣∣∣ ζ0−ζ12ζ1 CMτ,kF+1∣∣∣
σ
√
2
 n−1∏
m=1
1
2
erfc
−
∣∣∣ ζ0−ζ12ζ1 CMτ,kF+1+m∣∣∣
σ
√
2
 .
(18)
Notice that n can be any positive integer, since the failure state is not reversible.
Moreover, it is clear that if n→∞, then EDPn → 0, that is, it is not likely that
the Error decays to zero and remains null forever. However, we can approximate
this ideal situation, as we will see in the next.
The considerations about the EDP made in this section are now applied to
the case of constant input f(t). More precisely we will exploit them to establish
suitable design criteria, that is, which is the best choice of parameters to obtain
the maximum performance from the One State Algorithm.
4.7 Constant input f(t)
If the input f(t) is constant, say f ≡ 1, the system evolution does not depend
on time step k. In fact, Mτ,k = Mτ = (e
τA − I)A−1B for any k = 1, . . . ,K.
Hence,
EDPn(1, 0, ζ0, ζ0) =
1
2
erfc
−
∣∣∣ ζ0−ζ12ζ0 CMτ ∣∣∣
σ
√
2
n (19)
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for any n ∈ N such that n+ 1 ≤ kF and
EDPn(kF + 1, 0, ζ0, ζ1) =
1
2
erfc
−
∣∣∣ ζ0−ζ12ζ0 CMτ ∣∣∣
σ
√
2
1
2
erfc
−
∣∣∣ ζ0−ζ12ζ1 CMτ ∣∣∣
σ
√
2
n−1 .
(20)
In terms of signal-to-noise ratio, we can write
√
SNR(η) =
∣∣∣ ζ1−ζ02η CMτ ∣∣∣
σ
√
2
so that
EDPn(1, 0, ζ0, ζ0) =
[
1
2
erfc
(
−
√
SNR(ζ0)
)]n
EDPn(kF + 1, 0, ζ0, ζ1) =
1
2
erfc
(
−
√
SNR(ζ0)
)[1
2
erfc
(√
SNR(ζ1)
)]n−1
.
Under the hypothesis 0 < ζ1 < ζ0 = 1, SNR(ζ0) < SNR(ζ1), that is EDP
m(k0, 0, ζ0, ζ0) <
EDPm(k1, 0, ζ1, ζ1); in other terms, our detection algorithm is more sensitive to
false positives, then our fault tolerant control method is more efficient after the
failure. Hence, the suitable design criteria for the pre-failure state will auto-
matically be appropriate also for the post-failure state. This is why in the next
we will generically name
SNR = SNR(ζ0) and EDP
n = EDPn(k0, 0, ζ0, ζ0) =
[
1
2
erfc
(
−
√
SNR
)]n
.
(21)
The next section is devoted to the study of design criteria for our FTC
system, on the basis of the theoretical analysis developed in the last pages.
Particular attention will be paid to the case of constant f(t), for which optimal
criteria can be formulated.
5 Design Criteria
In this section, our aim is to provide the design criteria to obtain the best
performance from our FTC scheme, based on the One State Algorithm.
The key point of this issue is that the controller is supposed to be free
to choose the sampling time step τ , hence our goal is to give the criteria to
determine the otpimal τ , which, in our framework, can be defined as the one
that minimizes the Error Function, in the sense that we now explain. Given
the failure system (1,10) and a time window W = nτ not containing the switch
point, our first purpose is to maximize the probability that Ek remains null (if
we set before the failure) or decays to zero (if we set after the failure) along the
interval W . Furthermore, given that in (TF , TF + τ ] a correct detection causes
a failed compensation and a consequent abrupt deviation in the output y (as
we will show in the numerical simulations), our second purpose is to minimize
the peak of this unavoidable deviation.
15
This qualitative discussion is now quantified in two different input instances:
f(t) constant and f(t) sinusoidal. As far as the first case in concerned, we
will show that the theoretic analysis of Section 4 provides the instrument to
determine the sampling time that minimizes the Error Function in an analytic
way. On the other hand, when the input is not constant some difficulties arise in
the definition of the optimal τ ; however, we will explain how to obtain suitable
values of τ by a numerical numerical computation, still based on the analysis of
Section 4.
5.1 Design Criteria in the case of constant input f(t)
Recalling the Paragraph 4.7 and in particular the simplified notation (21), let
us explain how to define the optimal τ when f(t) ≡ 1. As just said, we aim to
maximize the EDP in a given time window W not containing the failure instant
and to minimize the peak of the deviation immediately after the failure. In
particular, if EkF = 0, by definition 12, the extent of the peak in the output is
given by maxt∈(0,τ ] | ζ1−ζ0ζ0 CMt|. In brief, we intend to provide
τ1 = argmax
τ>0
EDPW/τ and τ2 = argmin
τ>0
(
max
t∈(0,τ ]
|CMt|
)
(22)
The optimum will be τ1 = τ2, but in general this is not the case. Then, we
define the optimal τ as follows: we do not look for the maximum EDP, but we
just require EDPW/τ > 1− ε where ε << 1 is a fixed tolerance. In other terms,
we demand that the EDP be very close to 1. Then, the optimal τ , indicated by
τopt = τopt(ε), is :
τopt = argmin
τ : EDPW/τ>1−ε
(
max
t∈(0,τ ]
|CMt|
)
. (23)
5.1.1 Application to the Flight Control Problem
Let us now compute τopt for the Flight Control Problem introduced in the
Paragraph 2.1, in the case of constant input f(t). In the Figure 1, the graph of
CMτ in function of τ is shown. In particular, we notice that CMτ is negative for
any τ > 0, achieves a global minimun at τ0 = 0.55 and converges to a constant
value for a sufficienlty large τ . Then, if τ > τ0, maxt∈(0,τ ] |CMt| = |CMτ0 |, that
is, the peak is fixed and we cannot control it. This undesired occurrence can be
prevented by imposing
τ ∈ (0, τ0].
In this interval, CMτ is monotone decreasing and maxt∈(0,τ ] |CMt| = |CMτ |.
Then, fixed the tolerance ε, our aim is the computation of
τopt = argmin
τ∈(0,τ0]:EDPW/τ>1−ε
|CMτ |. (24)
Notice that
EDPW/τ =
[
1
2
erfc
(
−
√
SNR
)]W/τ
=
[
1
2
erfc
(
−
| ζ1−ζ02ζ0 CMτ |
σ
√
2
)]W/τ
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is monotone increasing as a function of τ . Then, let τm = τm(ε) be the minimum
τ in (0, τ0] such that EDP
W/τ > 1− ε (if it exists). Then
τopt = argmin
τ≥τm
|CMτ | = τm. (25)
Now, let assign numerical values to the parameter and solve the corresponding
instance. Suppose that:
ζ0 = 1 ζ1 =
1
2
σ2 = 2
ε = 10−3 W = 20
(26)
In this case, τopt = 0.112 as shown in Figure 2.
The value of τopt clearly depends on the noise and in particular there can exist
noise values for which there is no τ making EDPW/τ > 1− ε: for instance, this
occurs if we consider σ2 > 34.72 in the example (26) (the range of admittible
σ2’s with the corresponding τopt’s is shown in Figure 3). In such situation, one
should allow a lower threshold 1− ε.
In Section 6 we will show a few simulations about the Flight Example.
5.2 Design Criteria in the case of input f(t) = sin t
When f(t) is not constant, it is more difficult to study analytical design criteria
as the quality of the detection depends on time. In particular, at each time step
kτ the detection is affected by the values of f(t), t ∈ ((k − 1)τ, kτ), then any
detection step is different from the others and an analogous of (23) cannot be
provided: roughly speaking, the optimum would be to change τ according to
the shape of f(t) in each considered interval.
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Figure 2: EDPW/τ in function of τ in the instance (26). The second graph is a
zoom that allows to see that τopt = 0.112
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When f(t) is periodic, we can suggest some numerical computation in order to
fix a suitable τ . In fact, if we compute EDPW/τ (1, 0, ζ0, ζ0) for a sufficiently large
W , we get an idea about the sampling times that are more suitable. On the other
hand, there is no way to control the amplitude of the deviation in case of failure,
since this again depends on time. The idea is then to choose as samling time that
maximises EDPW/τ (1, 0, ζ0, ζ0) or that makes it larger than a given threshold,
being conscious that this does not arrange the anavoidable deviation. Let us
illustrate these observations in the Flight Control Problem with f(t) = sin t and
parameters given by (26). First, let us numerically compute EDPW/τ (1, 0, ζ0, ζ0)
in function of τ , the result being presented in Figure 4: the graph shows a clear
unsettled behavior which cannot be described analytically. However, it also
suggests the values of τ that give an high EDPW/τ (1, 0, ζ0, ζ0) and which can
then considered suitable. No general consideration can be derived, except that
a very small τ is in general not preferable.
More details about this instance can be retrieved in the simulations presented
in the next Section.
6 Flight Control Problem: a few simulations
In this section, we show some simulations concerning the application of the One
State Algorithm to the Flight FTC example presented in the Paragraph 2.1 and
studied in the previous paragraphs.
In a time interval [0, T ] = [0, 40], we suppose that a failure occurs at TF = 20
and causes the switch of the disturbance function z(t) from ζ0 = 1 to ζ1 = 1/2
(ζ1 = 1/2 might represent a loss of effectiveness of 50% of the elevator of the
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aircraft). The lecture noise is a gaussian random variable N (0, 2). We consider
boht the cases of input f ≡ 1 and f(t) = sin t and we show the behavior of the
One State procedure for different values of τ . The graphs represent the output
y(t) of the system.
Figure 5 reproduces the case f ≡ 1. The first graph compares the nominal
system, that is, the desirable trajectory, to the faulty system with no compensa-
tion: after the failure, the trajectory of the latter is sensibily uncorrect. In the
other graphs, we introduce the compensation using the One State Algorithm:
as proved in the Paragraph 5.1.1 , τopt = 0.112. In the second graph, we fix
τ = 0.4, which is larger than τopt: we obtain a correct detection at each step,
but the unavoidable deviation is not optimized: in fact, considering τopt (third
graph), we have a smaller peak after the failure. Furthermore, we see that also
τ = 0.09 is suitable, even if, the corresponding EDPW/τ > 1− ε. On the other
hand, τ = 0.07 assures a good detection only after the failure (this is consistent
with our observation about the different sensitivity ot false positives and false
negatives), while a too small sampling time (τ = 0.001) causes instabililty: the
detection is not reliable and the Error is always nonnull.
Figure 6 concerns the case f(t) = sin t. Again, the output of the system
with no compensation in the first graph undergoes an evident change after the
failure at TF = 20. Instead, applying the One State Algorithm with time step
τ = 0.525 (this value being suggested by the numerical computation of the
EDP) allows to recover the nominal condition. The same occurs with τ = 0.35,
which is preferable for the smaller amplitude of the unavoidable deviation in
correspondence to the switch point.
When τ = 0.3, some detections fail (the error percentage is about 4%), but
the output y is not dramatically affected by them. Furthermore, when τ = 0.01
the error percentage is about 9%: many deviations occur, but they are not very
20
large. In particular, they are quite null when the slope of y(t) is steeper. In
correspondence to the switch point a plain oscillation is present, but it is less
remarkable than in the cases of larger τ .
Decreasing τ again, the percentage of wrong detections does not overpass
10%, but for very small values of τ , the system is unstable (see for instance, the
last graph corresponding to τ = 0.001) and many oscillations occur.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, an original Fault Tolerant Control method, based on Information
and Coding Theory, has been introduced. Given a linear system with a distur-
bance and supposing that the disturbance function is quantized over two levels,
the detection task can be tackled by decoding techniques. In particular, we
have introduced the One State Algorithm which is a low-complexity, recursive
decoding algorithm, derived from the BCJR. Its application to a Flight FTC
problem has generated satisfactory outcomes even in case of relative high noise
in the data acquisition.
The low-complexity encourages the implementation of this method; more-
over, adjusting the sampling time step τ , one can improve its performance,
according to the different values of noise and of input f . In some cases, for in-
stance when f is constant, an optimal value of τ can be analytically computed
with sufficient precision, where the optimality is intended in terms of trade-off
between convergence conditions and amplitude of the deviations. Other ar-
rangements might be obtained changing the values and the number of levels of
quantization.
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Figure 5: Output y(t): Nominal System vs System with a failure at TF = 20,
with lecture noise of variance σ2 = 2 and f ≡ 1. Six different cases are shown:
the first graph represents the system with no control and compensation; the
other ones are with compensation, respectively with time step τ equal to 0.4,
0.12, 0.09, 0.07, 0.01
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Figure 6: Output y(t): Nominal System vs System with a failure at TF = 20,
with lecture noise of variance σ2 = 2 and f(t) = sin t. Six different cases are
shown: the first graph represents the system with no control and compensation;
the other ones are with compensation, respectively with time step τ equal to
0.525, 0.35, 0.3, 0.01, 0.001
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